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Abstract 
Over the last few decades, philosophers and social scientists have applied the so-called powers ontology 
to the social domain. I argue that this application is highly problematic: many of the alleged powers in 
the social realm violate the intrinsicality condition, and those that can be coherently taken to be intrinsic 
to their bearers are arguably causally redundant. I end the paper by offering a diagnosis of why 
philosophers and social scientists have been tempted to think that there are powers in social realm.  
 
 
1. Introduction 
Since the early 1970s, non-Humean causal powers – often referred to simply as powers – have 
made a prominent return to philosophy.1 Initially invoked primarily in the philosophy of 
physics and chemistry (e.g. Harré 1970; Harré and Madden 1975; Harré 1997; Bhaskar 
1975/2008; Cartwright 1983), powers were subsequently put to use in metaphysics (e.g. 
Shoemaker 1980/1997; Johansson 1989/2004; Ellis 2001; Molnar 2003; Bird 2007; Mumford 
and Anjum 2011), the philosophy of biology (Dupré 1996), and, in recent years, the 
philosophy of social science and social ontology (e.g. Archer 1995; Cartwright 1999; Lawson 
2007, 2013; Porpora 2008; Elder-Vass 2010; Groff 2011; Kaidesoja 2013; but see already 
Bhaskar 1979/1998). Indeed, there is now an interdisciplinary movement, called critical 
realism, which among other things applies powers to the social realm. In this paper, I question 
the deployment of powers within the social domain.2 I also offer a diagnosis of how and 
where defenders of that deployment go astray. I do so by distinguishing between true ability 
predications and powers, between constitutive (or “performative”) abilities and powers, and 
																																																						
1	Terminological alternatives here abound. Names for powers have included: “tendencies” (e.g. Johansson 
1989/2004), “capacities” (e.g. Cartwright 1999), “dispositional properties” (Ellis 2001), “potencies” (e.g. Bird 
2007), and, in indeterministic contexts, “propensities” (e.g. Dupré 1996). The concept can arguably be traced 
back to Aristotle (e.g. Metaphysics, book Theta), as advocates of powers generally acknowledge.  
2 For a recent attack on macro powers, see Bird (2016). Although the present paper is in line with Bird’s, he does 
not address the specific problems associated with powers in the social realm. 
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between deontic powers and causal powers. These distinctions tend to be jumbled up in the 
literature. 
The plan is as follows: I begin by identifying the core features of powers, as 
they are generally characterized in the literature (Section 2). I then look at powers in the 
social domain, and I argue that they are either contradictory or causally redundant entities 
(Section 3). I end the paper with my diagnosis (or diagnoses) of why philosophers and social 
scientists have been tempted to think that there are powers in the social realm (Section 4).  
 
2. What are powers? A brief recap of their core features 
Powers are generally taken to be real – i.e. ontic, non-nominalistic (sometimes called 
“sparse”, as opposed to “abundant”3) – properties with the following characteristics: 
 
(a) they are intrinsic to their bearers;4 
  
(b) they have their causal abilities essentially.5  
 
Characteristic (a) entails that powers are not extrinsic properties, i.e. properties that are had by 
objects in virtue of their standing (or not standing) in certain relations to external entities.6 
Characteristic (b) makes powers distinct from categorical properties. Categorical properties 
are properties that have their causal abilities (if any) only contingently (e.g. via contingent 
																																																						
3	Properties understood in nominalistic terms (e.g. in terms of true predications or set-theoretic constructions) 
are widely regarded as “abundant”: for example, according to standard set nominalism, any set of objects, no 
matter how disparate and gerrymandered, is a “property” (e.g. Lewis 1986: 59-60). Ontic or “natural” properties 
such as universals and tropes (causal powers may be either: see e.g. Molnar 2003:23 and Bird 2007: 12-13) are 
generally taken to be much harder to come by – hence the term “sparse” (Lewis 1986: 60, 64). Crucially, on the 
ontic conception of powers, it need not be the case that every true dispositional predication corresponds to a 
power (see e.g. Ellis 2001: 112; Molnar 2003: 27-28; Bird 2007, Ch. 2). I will return to this issue below, in 
particular in Section 4. 	
4	For example, Rom Harré (1970: 85, emphasis original) states: “X has the power to A = if X is subject to stimuli 
or conditions of an appropriate kind, then X will do A, in virtue of its intrinsic nature.” See also Harré and 
Madden (1975: 86); Harré (1997: 21, 24); Bhaskar (1975/2008: 231); Shoemaker (1980/1997: 241, 243); 
Johansson (1989/2004: 163, 171); Cartwright (1999: 72, 138); Ellis (2001: 106); Molnar (2003: 58, 108-110); 
Lawson (2007: 123); Bird (2007: 29-31, 125); Groff (2011: 309); Kaidesoja (2013: 136); Little (2016: 192, 196); 
Marmodoro (2017: 62-63). The intrinsicality condition is arguably also present in Aristotle’s theorizing about 
dunamis (his term for potentiality or power) – see e.g. Metaphysics, book Theta, chapter I.	
5	 See, e.g., Shoemaker (1980/1997: 234, 236-239, 244); Ellis (2001: 52-53, 112, 124); Chakravartty (2007: 
130); Bird (2007: 3; 2016); Groff (2011: 309); Mumford and Anjum (2011: 5); Cartwright and Pemberton (2013: 
95).	
6	Powers are no doubt standardly taken to be related to, or “directed” towards, their possible and actual 
manifestation effects, but these relations are typically supposed to flow from, or be grounded in, the nature of the 
powers rather than the other way round (pace Barker 2013; see e.g. Molnar 2003, Ch. 3; Chakravartty 2007: 
139-141, 146-147; Heil 2012: 144-148; but see Bird 2007, Ch. 6, for a structuralist analysis of powers’ identities 
– he denies, however, rightly in my view, that such an account renders powers extrinsic, ibid: 141.)	
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laws of nature). They are so-called quiddities: properties whose identity is not tied to what 
they can do. By contrast, a power’s identity is tied to what it can do. 
Powers thus understood are usually invoked for two purposes: to defend strong 
production, as opposed to regularity, views of causation (e.g. Harré and Madden 1975; 
Bhaskar 1975/2008; Shoemaker 1980/1997; Cartwright 1983; Johansson 1989/2004; 
Ingthorsson 2002; Molnar 2003; Mumford and Anjum 2011; Marmodoro 2017), and to 
eliminate or deflate the role of laws of nature in explanations of events and cross-time 
regularities (Cartwright 1983, 1999; Ellis 2001; Mumford 2004; Chakravartty 2007; Bird 
2007; Cartwright and Pemberton 2013). Powers in the social domain are typically postulated 
to serve both of these functions (see e.g. Elder-Vass 2010 for an instructive overview and 
discussion).  
 
3. Putative powers in the social domain 
Concrete examples of powers at work in the social domain are surprisingly rare in the 
literature. Defenders of powers in the social realm tend to focus more on abstract theorizing, 
and on programmatic formulations and defences. Nevertheless, examples are occasionally 
supplied. The Cambridge economist Tony Lawson, for example, maintains in a recent volume 
dedicated to Roy Bhaskar (who was a student of Rom Harré’s and co-founder of the modern 
conception of powers): 
 
My contention is not only that there are indeed causal properties, powers and entities 
reasonably so identified as social, but also that such features are just as real or 
objective as those of any other domain, bearing their own irreducible causal powers, 
justifying and indeed warranting their separate, specialised and relatively autonomous 
form of scientific study. […] Among the global powers of social systems [e.g. tribes, 
families, universities, firms, trade unions, political parties, research groups, sports 
clubs, armies, etc. (p. 297)] are the abilities to stage Olympic Games, wage wars, raise 
taxes, hold elections, establish international treaties, conduct strikes, form monetary 
unions, and so on. (Lawson 2013: 286, 298)  
 
And Lawson says about individuals in, or members of, social systems that:  
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…individuals positioned as members of a particular community become the bearers of 
emergent positional powers. Thus a police officer can arrest suspects, a judge can pass 
a sentence, and doctors prescribe drugs. (Lawson 2013: 298) 
 
Lawson is not alone in presenting these kinds of example: similar claims can be found 
scattered in the work of other supporters of a powers-based social ontology.7 Lawson’s 
formulations are particularly succinct, however, and I will therefore attend primarily to them 
in what follows, referring to additional examples and claims when needed.  
Now, the question that should be asked – but which is not asked by proponents 
of powers in the social realm – is how the postulated powers fare with respect to benchmarks 
(a) and (b). I shall argue that they fare badly on (a). However, in focusing on (a) I am not 
suggesting that their compatibility with (b) is unproblematic. Far from it – I think there are 
problems here, but that these become largely redundant given what I argue below.8 
  So: Are the putative powers mentioned by Lawson intrinsic to their bearers? I 
think it is evident that a large proportion are not.  
Consider to begin with individuals bearing so-called positional powers: the 
purported powers of policemen, judges and doctors. Clearly – as no doubt Lawson would 
																																																						
7	For example, sociologist Dave Elder-Vass mentions the causal power of a “norm circle” to influence the 
normative beliefs and behaviour of individual persons (2010: 124), an organisation to dismiss employees and to 
sell various products (ibid.: 73, 173), a university to assign marks (ibid.: 199), and a bank to make loans to 
persons (2012: 89). Moreover, summing up his views, Elder-Vass states: “These emergent properties are, I have 
argued, identical with the real causal powers described by Roy Bhaskar in his theory of causation.” Nancy 
Cartwright, who expresses her intellectual debt to Harré (Cartwright 1999: 73), maintains that taxes have the 
capacity (her word for power) to affect prices, and that price has the capacity to affect quantity supplied (ibid.: 
55, 60). Mumford and Anjum suggest that money has the power to cause happiness (Mumford and Anjum 2011: 
89). And so on. Note that Harré himself originally applied the power notion to the social domain, although in 
later work he is sceptical of this application (e.g. Harré 2013). For example, in his 1970 paper, he remarks in 
passing that to be a deputy, a hangman, or an attorney, one has to have certain powers that are part of the nature 
of being a deputy etc.: “To strip a deputy of his powers is just what is required to make him cease to be a deputy. 
A hangman without the power of execution is a hangman no longer, he is but a former hangman.” (Harré 1970: 
92; see also Harré and Madden 1975: 95). 
8	Nevertheless, let me briefly indicate one worry one might have about (b): Supposing that being a police officer, 
being a judge, being a university and so on are ontic properties (which is doubtful, see my 2014a and below), it 
can be questioned whether such sortal properties have their (alleged) causal abilities essentially. It seems clear 
that the abilities of police officers, judges, and universities (as entities instantiating these sortal properties) are 
contingent and depend on such factors as the legal system. The abilities of police officers and universities can be 
changed over time, and at a given time they may differ between countries. Thus, on the assumption that the 
relevant abilities are causal (which I will question below), it seems that they are in any case not essential features 
of the sortal properties in question (cf. Little 2016: 196-198). The essentialist aspect may be more plausible in 
relation to mere “characterizing” social properties, such as having the ability to raise taxes, having the ability to 
hold elections etc., but the case for essentialism in these cases should nevertheless be argued for, not tacitly 
assumed. In the end I think these considerations are idle: below I will argue that in addition to being extrinsic, 
many of the abilities in question are not causal but “constitutive”. Moreover, I will argue that the abilities that 
can coherently be conceived of as intrinsic and causal properties turn out, on close scrutiny, to be mere 
overdeterminers and hence redundant properties.   
	 5	
unhesitatingly agree – it is only relative to a societal context that a certain person, with a 
certain history, is a policeman, judge or doctor, and has the ability (in the society in question) 
to arrest suspects, pass sentences, or prescribe drugs. To dramatize: an intrinsic duplicate of 
the person in question (as the person is at a certain time) existing alone on a remote planet 
would not have these powers.9 It is precisely because these abilities are relative to a societal 
context (i.e. to the attitudes of external agents, to regulatory structures, and so on) that they 
fall under the province of social ontology (cf. Searle 1995) and can be called social abilities. 
If they were not relative to social context, they would be mere individual abilities and not 
features of social reality. Again, I think Lawson would readily agree with this verdict of 
extrinsicness: indeed, he is explicitly developing a social ontology (e.g. Lawson 2013: 285, 
288 ff.), and the powers in question are supposed to be positional powers, i.e. powers 
attaching to a position within society (ibid: 292-293, 298). But then the obvious objection is 
that positional powers cannot really be Aristotelian/Harréan/Bhaskarian powers, not as long 
as they attach to a position the features of which are socially grounded. That is, it must be 
false, strictly speaking, that “individuals positioned as members of a particular community 
become the bearers of emergent positional powers” (Lawson 2013: 298, my emphasis). 
Consider next the putative “global” (or higher-level) powers of social systems. 
In principle, abilities of groups and other complex social entities can be said to be social in the 
trivial sense that they are abilities of, or ascribed to, complex entities consisting of many 
people. Several of the examples here, however, concern abilities that are relative to a larger 
societal context in the same way that the social abilities of individuals are social, i.e. in the 
sense of “social” or “positional” referred to in the paragraph above: let us call this extrinsic 
																																																						
9	According some contemporary cosmologists, it may very well be that we do not have to imagine that such a 
solitary person exists in a non-actual possible world: they argue that if the universe is infinitely large, as there are 
reasons to think it is, and if matter is evenly distributed across it, there will be infinitely many such duplicates 
across the actual universe (see e.g. Greene 2011, Ch. 2).  
A possible escape route from the duplication objection: endorse so-called qua-objects (e.g. Fine 1999: 
67-68). That is, hold that the relevant powers are intrinsic to the policeman/judge/doctor in question qua 
policeman/judge/doctor (i.e. under that description), and that any intrinsic duplicate of the relevant qua-object 
consequently will have these very powers (thanks to Fabrice Correia and Christian List for pointing out this 
escape route). Notice, though, that this move – which excludes solitary intrinsic duplicates – can only be 
defended at the price of denying that specific policemen, judges, and doctors are numerically identical with 
ordinary persons. On the qua-view, they are rather identical with peculiar compounds consisting of a person plus 
the relevant social property. Elsewhere, I argue against the existence of such qua-objects (see my 2014a: 530-
533, 542): on my view, a specific policeman/judge/doctor is numerically identical with a certain person – a 
policeman does not contain a person as a proper part. Rather, the person in question simply has acquired a new, 
extrinsic, social status (arguably, a social sortal “property” of a non-ontic, abundant kind) of being a 
policeman/judge/doctor in the society in question.  
Interestingly, by referring to an enlarged entity, the qua-move does have some affinities with the 
system/community move discussed in the main text below. Nevertheless, it should be distinguished from it. A 
qua-object generated from an individual under a social description is not a social system consisting of many 
individuals, but rather a compound consisting of an individual plus a social property (cf. Fine, ibid.). 	
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mode of being social, socialE. (Lawson’s own brief characterization of “social features” does 
not strictly distinguish between these two modes of sociality: “Primary candidates for features 
to be classified as social, I take it, are those […] that arise out of, and depend necessarily 
upon, human interactions (clearly constituting a unique mode of being); those, if any, that 
could not exist in the absence of human beings and their doings” (Lawson 2013: 285). This 
kind of ambiguity is endemic in current social ontology literature.) For example, it is only 
relative to a wider societal context that a certain group of people constitutes a government, 
and has the ability to raise taxes, declare war, or ratify international treatises; and it is only 
relative to a larger societal context that a firm exists, and has the ability to issue shares, sell 
products, and hire and dismiss employees; and so on. Thus, the objection mentioned in the 
previous paragraph generalizes: typically, even the alleged powers of social systems are 
extrinsic, and hence not powers in the technical sense.10	
 One way of rescuing these alleged powers, and showing that they are after all 
intrinsic properties, is to hold that they are really powers of a larger social system of which 
the individual or the relevant social system is a proper part. Following this, the powers would 
be social, not socialE. This adjusted view (or something similar) appears occasionally to be 
advocated by defenders of powers in the social domain, although not explicitly with the 
purpose of defending intrinsicality. For example, Lawson – I think incoherently – says of 
individuals and their alleged positional powers (I suppose he would want to extend the 
reasoning to positional powers of social sub-systems as well): 
 
…the positional powers are always system properties and individuals remain the 
agents of these powers only when appropriately positioned and relationally 
organised as components of the system. Thus when a police officer arrests a 
suspect, or a judge passes sentence, the powers of arrest or sentencing are those of 
the community. (Lawson 2013: 298, my emphases; see also Elder-Vass 2010: 27-
28)  
																																																						
10	Could defenders of powers in the social domain simply retort that apart from the classic intrinsic powers, 
there are extrinsic versions of them? One difficulty here is that critical realists and their kin often explicitly claim 
to be adopting the theory of powers as developed by Harré and his followers (see e.g. Lawson 2007: 20-21, and 
fn. 7 above), or even by Aristotle. Indeed, the article by Lawson in question is published in an anthology entitled 
Powers and Capacities in Philosophy: The New Aristotelianism. Clearly, these notable forerunners take powers 
to be intrinsic properties or features of objects (see footnote 4 above). A second difficulty is that it is unclear 
what ontic, non-Humean (and non-Armstrongean – see e.g. his 1997) extrinsic causal powers could be – even if 
we allow that the technical term “power” does not analytically entail intrinsicality, which it arguably does, as it 
is generally defined in the literature. No one has tried to explain this. In any case, in Section 4 I will offer an 
alternative, constructive account of these putative powers according to which they are not productive abilities but 
rather extrinsically grounded constitutive abilities.					
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It is important to note, though, that if these powers of individuals and sub-systems really are 
instantiated at the level of whole communities, then strictly speaking there cannot be any 
positional powers. For, if the powers are really instantiated by the relevant system as a whole, 
it cannot truly be said that “individuals positioned as members of a particular community 
become the bearers of emergent positional powers” and that “individuals remain the agents 
of these powers” when appropriately positioned and relationally organised (Lawson 2013: 
298, my emphasis) – unless, of course, people like Lawson want to hold that the relevant 
powers are instantiated both by communities as wholes and by their relevant sub-
components.11 If they do want to defend this last elaboration, the objection from extrinsicality 
discussed above simply reappears: sub-components can only be bearers or agents of these 
powers on pain of rendering the powers extrinsic. I take it, then, that the community move can 
only save the relevant powers as bone fide powers (in all their manifestations) if the powers in 
question are regarded as strictly emergent properties – that is, as ontic, irreducible properties 
of complex wholes which are not also instantiated by proper parts of the wholes in question.12 
(Compare with Lawson, who calls the would-be positional powers of individuals within 
societies “emergent positional powers” (2013: 298). It is not crystal clear what concept(s) of 
emergence Lawson is operating with. One possibility is that he is alluding to Mario Bunge’s 
unorthodox definition of emergence: “P is an emergent property of a thing b if and only if 
either b is a complex thing (system) no component of which possesses P, or b is an individual 
that possesses P by virtue of being a component of a system (i.e. b would not possess P if it 
were independent or isolated)” (Bunge 1996: 20). However, the problem here is that the latter 
																																																						
11	Some formulations by Elder-Vass seem to suggest such a double view. Speaking of “intrastructuration” of 
organisations, he says, for example: ”those properties that the individual acquires by occupying their role are 
essentially properties of the organisation localized in the individual”; and “The causal power of the organisation 
to sell a television [Please note that this ability depends on factors and regulations that are external to the 
organisation in question. THW] is in effect delegated to the salesperson, who exercises that causal power on the 
organisation’s behalf.” (Elder-Vass 2010:158, 173) However, other remarks by Elder-Vass suggest a view 
according to which the double position is rejected: only the organization (or the relevant higher-level entity) is 
said to “really” instantiate the relevant power (ibid.: 27-28; see also Elder-Vass 2012: 88). 	
12	I take reducibility to involve identification (see my 2017b). Since I am skeptical (see my 2014b and 2017b ; 
see also Smid 2017, Ch. 3) about the so-called composition as identity thesis (Cotnoir and Baxter 2014), I would 
regard even so-called “structural properties” (i.e. higher-level ontic properties that are somehow composed of the 
properties of the proper parts of the object instantiating the higher level property (see e.g. Armstrong 1979: 69)) 
as strictly emergent properties (pace e.g. O’Connor 1994). It should be noted, though, that powers are rarely 
regarded as mere structural properties in the literature. They are typically supposed to be uncomposed “simple” 
properties, although they may be held to ontologically depend on the composition and property structure of the 
object they are instantiated by (see e.g. Molnar 2003: 28-28, 36-37 for discussion). In any case, for essentially 
the same reason as the one discussed in the text below, I see no reason to postulate strictly emergent social 
structural powers: they would be causally redundant. Also, for completeness, I should mention that I take strict 
emergence to be neutral with respect to the distinction between “weak” (roughly, explainable) and “strong” 
(unexplainable) emergence sometimes alluded to in the literature (see e.g. Elder-Vass 2010; cf. my 2014b). 	
	 8	
disjunct has application to extrincis properties only; it cannot capture emergence of powers. 
Only the first disjunct can be of relevance here, strictly speaking.) 
 Postulating strictly emergent properties at the level of communities 
is deeply problematic, however – even if we disregard the troubling fact that it is unclear what 
the boundaries of communities are, and hence what the real bearers of these powers are. If a 
community has strictly emergent causal powers to hold elections, raise taxes, arrest suspects, 
and pass sentences, then it has, as a whole, causal powers to affect (among other things) its 
own proper parts and constituents. This type of causation, from wholes to proper parts, is 
usually referred to as downward causation. Infamously, the notion faces various difficulties. 
First, it is not clear how downward causation is supposed to work – some have even 
questioned the very coherence of the notion (see e.g. Kim 1999 and Hulswit 2006 for detailed 
discussions). Secondly, and relatedly, downward causation (assuming it exists) seems in many 
cases to be a redundant phenomenon given the causal abilities and activities of the whole’s 
interrelated parts: unless the emergent causal powers of the whole can somehow intervene, 
and alter the constituents’ interactions, there seems to be nothing left for the higher-level 
powers to do (see e.g. Merricks 2001, 2005, and Bird 2008 – this is often referred to as the 
exclusion argument). Now, I am not aware of a general proof to the effect that there can be no 
non-redundant downward causation in the social realm (assuming the coherence of the 
concept as such), but elsewhere (Hansson Wahlberg 2014b) I have argued in some detail, 
considering various examples from different “levels” of social reality, that there is little 
reason to believe in such a phenomenon in the social sphere.  
Importantly, Lawson himself denies that there is any downward causation from 
wholes (exerted by their “global powers”) to proper parts in society :13 
 
Downward causation is usually defined in terms of an emergent (higher-level) entity 
having a causal effect by way of causally impacting its own (lower-level) components. 
But of course, a whole cannot causally impact its own parts; it can only act through 
them. […] Clearly, if a social totality exhibits powers of a sort not possessed by any of 
its components [sic], such causal powers nevertheless emerge only through the 
relational organisation (involving the empowerment [sic]) of its components, and are 
exercised, as mechanism or process, only through the actions of its relationally 
organised (human) individual components. An Olympic Games, concert, war or 
																																																						
13	Here Lawson seems to have changed his mind: compare his (2007: 124).		
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industrial strike cannot be staged other than through the activities of various 
participants. (Lawson 2013: 287, 298; my emphasis)     
 
Thus, on Lawson’s own view, to account for the unfolding of various processes and events 
within communities it is in principle enough to postulate suitably interrelated and interacting 
components (individuals). Emergent causal powers at the level of communities or social 
systems are not needed: these “global” powers would not do any additional causal work, over 
and above the causal work done by the suitably interrelated components (see also Searle 
2016: 406-407 for a similar complaint).14  
Note that these considerations also apply to mere “humdrum” social powers of 
social systems (i.e. not only to internalized, prima facie, socialE powers, which are the focus 
of Lawson’s discussion): any putative, intrinsic social power at the level of a social whole is 
arguably redundant given the abilities and interactions of the interrelated components. For 
example, the alleged social power of so-called norm circles (e.g. families and religious 
communities) to influence, as wholes, the normative beliefs of individual members of the 
circle (Elder-Vass 2010, Ch. 6) can arguably be accounted for fully by appealing to 
interactions among the members of the norm circle (see my (2014b) for discussion). There is 
simply no need to postulate an ontic power at the level of norm circles here. And the same 
kind of reasoning would seem to apply to alleged social powers that involve affecting entities 
that are external to the social system in question: for example, the putative power of a group 
of people to lift a sofa or smash a shop window (cf. Petersson 2007). There is little reason to 
think that a social system must have an ontic, higher-level causal power if the interrelated 
members are to be able, collectively, to lift a sofa or smash a shop window.15  
																																																						
14	Interestingly, in contrast to Lawson, Elder-Vass apparently regards loose or metaphorical locutions such as 
“acting through” as signifying downward causation (e.g. Elder-Vass 2010: 28, 172; 2012: 85-86, 88). It is 
unclear why though, considering the fact that Elder-Vass elsewhere clarifies that he does not think a whole has 
causal abilities beyond the causal powers of the proper parts when they are suitably interrelated, i.e. when they 
form a whole of the kind in question. As he puts it: “My argument is that (a) a set of configured interacting parts 
that compose a given whole at a given time, including both the parts themselves and the relations between them, 
is necessarily indistinguishable in terms of its causal capacities from (b) the whole itself at that same time.” 
(Elder-Vass 2014: 794) Moreover, according to Elder-Vass, when a whole “acts through” the parts, the 
interrelated parts “implement” the whole’s alleged causal powers (Elder-Vass 2010: 28). But then, in the end, the 
interrelated parts perform all the relevant work; the whole does not contribute with any extra causal oomph from 
a higher level. For detailed discussions and criticisms of Elder-Vass’s notions of emergence and downward 
causation, see my (2014b, 2014c). 	
15	I should acknowledge that Petersson is interested primarily in power attributions – more specifically, in the 
ordinary conceptions of causal agency and collective activity figuring in the content of the intentions of 
individuals that we, in ordinary language, would want to describe as being engaged in a “collective action” 
(Petersson 2007: 148, 153, 155). Moreover, according to Petersson (ibid.:  152), the appropriate level of a power 
attribution is usually a matter of pragmatics. So long as we are concerned with mere colloquial predication (and 
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To sum up: Neither individuals nor social systems can have any intrinsic socialE 
causal powers, because that would be a contradiction in terms. And mere social causal powers 
of social systems – i.e. ontic causal properties that are instantiated at the level of a social 
whole but which are not socialE and consequently can coherently be taken to be intrinsic – are 
arguably causally redundant. Thus, there seems to be no use for 
Aristotelian/Harréan/Bhaskarian powers in the social realm: they are either contradictory or 
causally redundant entities. 
Before concluding this section I should comment on Lawson’s brief remark that the 
organisational structure of a social system can exert downward causation. If structures can 
exert downward causation it might be hoped (as Lawson seems to suggest) that this kind of 
causation will involve or stem from non-redundant intrinsic social powers, and hence that 
there is genuine work for powers in the social realm to do after all.  
Lawson says: 
 
Along with the emergence of an entity or whole and its [redundant] “global” 
powers of efficient causation, emerges the entity’s organising structure. […] 
Confusion arise, because, or where, emergence is used as the criterion of higher or 
top, in a situation in which (by this criterion) there are at least two higher-level 
features that might be categorised as higher- or top-level: the emergent whole and 
the emergent organisational structure. Top-down or downward causation is 
intelligible in the case of reference to the latter but not the former. (Lawson 2013: 
286, 287; see also Lawson 2016b: 431) 
 
Introducing “structural” downward causation will not help to save social powers, however. 
(Unfortunately, in discussing this, I will have to rely to a large extent on my own 
understanding of what structural causation could involve. Lawson never quite explains how 
structures could exert any form of downward causation, certainly not of the powers variety. 
Occasionally, Lawson refers to the causation exerted by organisational structures as “formal 
causation” (Lawson 2013: 287; 2016a: 363), apparently alluding to the second of Aristotle’s 
four causes (Physics, book II, Ch. 3). But “formal causation” is rarely regarded as a genuinely 
causal concept by modern commentators on Aristotle; it is often described as picking out 
																																																																																																																																																																									
not with Ontology), I think this pragmatic stance regarding the level of a power attribution is perfectly 
acceptable: loose ability/dispositional/power talk (and thought) need not be made true by ontic, or “sparse,” 
powers (see footnote 3, and in particular Section 4 where this point is elaborated).	
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features of objects that help answering questions of the type “What is it?” (see e.g. Bostock 
1999: xxvi). Arguably, it is the third of Aristotle’s causes – roughly, efficient causation (“…a 
producer causes a product and a changer causes a change”, Physics:194b29) – which has most 
in common with modern conceptions of cause (Bostock 1999: xxv), certainly of the powers 
variety (see also Aristotle’s own explicit characterization of power-causation in Metaphysics, 
Theta, Ch. 5).) 
First, causation involving organisational structure – i.e. objects that are 
interrelated in certain ways – does not as such necessarily involve downward causation. 
Clearly, causation among objects or individuals must involve “organisational structure” in 
some form or another. Consider Newton’s law of gravity, according to which the distance 
between massive objects cannot be ignored. Even if we were to agree that mass has an 
intrinsic power to attract (and be attracted to) other masses in a mathematically specifiable 
way (a power that would partly account for the truth of the law-statement, were it true), we 
would have to concede that the spatial distance between interacting masses affects the 
magnitude of the gravitational forces created between the bodies involved (cf. Ellis 2001: 
137-138; Molnar 2003: 164-165). Likewise, in a society, individuals are manifestly 
interrelated in various ways (e.g. spatially and deontically), and these relations arguably make 
a difference to the way people behave (I will return to this below, Section 4). But the 
difference-making abilities of relations within a structure do not necessarily have anything to 
do with downward causation. The relevant relata (massive objects, individuals, and so on) 
may very well belong to the same level of reality (assuming here that the notion of reality 
being stratified into “levels” makes sense); and even if they do not, they do not, as a result, 
have to be related as parts and wholes to each other.16 Thus, to suggest that causation 
involving organisational structure is, as such, a case of downward causation is to invite 
confusion. 
Secondly, and importantly, the relations that partly make up the structure can in 
any case not themselves be powers in the traditional sense – because, being relations among 
components, they are not monadic, intrinsic properties. Thus, being a difference maker does 
not entail being a power. Lawson seems to assume – erroneously – that being a difference 
																																																						
16	Note, however, that sometimes “downward causation” refers simply to macro-to-micro causation (i.e. not 
necessarily to wholes influencing their own proper parts). Thus, if the “nodes” in a structure belong to different 
levels of reality, causation within the structure could involve downward causation in this more liberal sense. 
However, the exclusion argument can easily be applied to such downward causation as well: arguably, in most 
cases the interrelated components of the higher-level node can jointly do the causal work of the higher-level 
node (cf. the example of the breaking of the shop window mentioned above). 	
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maker does entail being a power. He writes, for example: “The organisation or arrangement of 
the bricks and other components [of a house] makes a difference. And on this criterion of 
causality, i.e. of possessing the power or ability to make a difference, the relational 
organisation is causal.” (Lawson 2013: 287, my emphasis) Being a difference maker may 
indeed involve being causal or causally relevant, as discussed above; but it does not need to 
involve being a power, as Lawson is apparently suggesting. Again, non-powers, such as 
relations, can “make a difference” by being entities that powers respond to in certain ways.    
Thirdly, if it is held that the organisational structure as a whole has emergent 
causal powers that can be exerted downward, the exclusion argument simply reapplies: all the 
relevant causation (production, difference making, etc.) appears to be going on within the 
structure – adding powers that act, so to speak, “holistically” or from the “top” of the structure 
seems therefore to be a straightforward violation of Occam’s Razor.  
Let me end this section by conceding that there is a regress argument looming 
here: if we reiterate the exclusion argument over and over again it seems that all causal 
powers drain away, except for those that exist at the level of elementary particles (if there is 
such a bottom level, see Schaffer 2003), which prima facie is an absurd consequence (see 
Block 2003; Elder-Vass 2012; 2014). However, on the assumption that there are powers at all, 
I do not find it evident that such a highly sparse version of the powers ontology is necessarily 
untenable (see e.g. Heil 2012; Bird 2016; my 2014c for discussion). For example, I think the 
exclusion argument could be applied with equal force to the putative powers of many of 
Cartwright and Pemberton’s so-called “nomological machines”, allegedly operating at the 
physical meso/macro levels: their example of a toilet cistern (Cartwright and Pemberton 2013: 
99, 103) is an obvious case in point (see also Elder-Vass’s 2012: 84 discussion of a torch). On 
the other hand, it might very well be that the regress stops before the fundamental level is 
reached, perhaps at the level of biological organisms or minds (assuming that downward 
causation as such is a coherent notion). The case has been made for the thesis that 
organisms/minds have emergent causal powers that defy the exclusion argument (see e.g. 
O’Connor 1994; O’Connor and Jacobs 2003; O’Connor and Wong 2005; Dupré 1996; 
Merricks 2001; Bird 2008; Lowe 2013; Harré 2013). Others have argued that the exclusion 
argument does not apply to chemical compounds (e.g. Needham 2009; Hendry 2017). And 
see Schaffer (2007:184-187) for a relevant discussion of emergence in the quantum realm (see 
also Calosi and Morganti 2016). However, I do not wish to evaluate these highly controversial 
claims about those specific domains here. In this paper, I am content to restrict my attention to 
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the social domain; and I argue that powers in the social realm (be they socialE or social) are 
highly problematic entities we have little reason to believe in and should not postulate. 
 
4. Diagnosis 
If there is precious little room for powers  in the social realm, why have philosophers and 
social scientists been inclined to postulate them? Here, I shall suggest three such reasons. (I 
should acknowledge that this section is to some extent speculative: it is hard to ascertain for 
sure what thought processes lie behind the problematic endorsement of social/socialE powers. 
Thanks to an anonymous reviewer here.)      
 First, talk about “abilities”, “capabilities”, “capacities” and “dispositions” may 
mistakenly be taken to entail, or analytically involve, ascriptions of ontic powers. Recall that 
Lawson expressed himself this way: 
  
Among the global powers of social systems are the abilities to stage Olympic Games, 
wage wars, raise taxes, hold elections, establish international treaties, conduct strikes, 
form monetary unions, and so on. […] a police officer can arrest suspects, a judge can 
pass a sentence, and doctors prescribe drugs. (Lawson, 2013: 298, my emphases)  
 
But statements ostensibly ascribing modal properties to objects or persons need not have truth 
conditions that involve the existence of ontic powers – at least, not if the relevant modally 
loaded expressions are used in an ordinary language, rather than technical, sense (and this 
goes for the very word “power” as well, I think) (cf. footnote 3, above).  
Arguably, the truth conditions of day-to-day statements ascribing abilities and 
dispositions to objects are generally, or often, merely of the following conditional form: if 
such and such were to happen, then such and such would (in indetermistic contexts: might) 
happen (cf. Ryle 1949/2002: 43, 123; Mackie 1973: 126-128; Lewis 1973: 38; Harré 2013: 
131, 138). The truth-makers for such loose statements may be a variety of things, including 
events in possible worlds (Lewis 1973), actual states of affairs together with laws of nature 
(Armstrong 1997), macro powers of interacting objects (Mumford and Anjum 2011), and 
powers of the relevant entities’ suitably interrelated constituents (Heil 2012; Harré 2013; Bird 
2016). Consequently, loose ordinary language statements about abilities and dispositions are 
not, as such, ontologically committal, although they may seem to be, due to their grammatical 
form. In particular, they do not express a specific commitment to intrinsic powers inhering in 
the grammatical subjects of the ascriptions; and they certainly do not express a commitment 
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to there being intrinsic powers instantiated at the same ontological level as the grammatical 
subjects.17 Accordingly, such statements are compatible with the relevant truth-makers 
consisting of lower-level objects and features, or objects and features that are external to the 
prima facie subject of the ability ascription: as just indicated, the truth-makers may involve 
laws of nature, external states of affairs and objects (possibly with intrinsic powers), and so 
on. Importantly – and typically this is not highlighted in the literature on disposition/ability 
ascriptions – the external factors may also  include legal regulations, social-historical 
circumstances, and external individuals with certain attitudes towards the subject of the 
ascription. Thus, in this relaxed sense there can clearly be “extrinsic dispositions”, “extrinsic 
abilities” or even “extrinsic powers”: i.e. there can be true ascriptions of 
disposition/ability/power predicates which are made true by factors external to the 
grammatical subject. But the idea that there are extrinsic dispositions/abilities/powers in this 
relaxed or “abundant” sense does not entail that there are extrinsic powers in the technical, 
ontic, sparse sense. (Cf. Bird’s (2007: 29-31, 125) discussion of McKitrick’s (2003).)			  
It is true that this simple conditional analysis of disposition/ability ascriptions 
has been called into question in connection with scenarios involving masks, finks and 
antidotes (e.g. Martin 1994), and that it has been concluded, in the light of such scenarios, that 
such ascriptions should after all be taken to involve the postulation of intrinsic powers (ibid., 
Molnar 1999). However, I think it is plausible to assume that the ascriptions are implicitly 
associated with some qualifying “ceteris paribus”, “in ideal conditions” or “absent intervening 
factors” clause (cf. my 2009). That would arguably save the conditional analysis from the 
alleged counter-examples. Besides, as I have highlighted elsewhere (Hansson 2006), the ontic 
powers interpretation of disposition ascriptions faces a serious problem of its own which the 
conditional analysis escapes: the powers account cannot explain certain entailment relations 
which intuitively connect some ability and disposition ascriptions, and these relations can be 
straightforwardly explained within the conditional analysis. For example: if “sugar is water-
soluble” (or the proposition expressed by the sentence, or the statement made when the 
																																																						
17	Advocates of social powers often state that the implementation of the relevant social power occurs at a level 
below the grammatical subject, i.e. that the causal mechanism is to be found at the level of interrelated 
individuals (e.g. Lawson 2013: 298; Elder-Vass 2010: 23-26, 28, 173; 2012: 88). They nevertheless want to 
ascribe social abilities and powers to social entities as wholes. I suggest that this move (involving the postulation 
of redundant higher-level powers) is partly motivated, or illicitly influenced, by colloquial speech: in ordinary 
language, we habitually ascribe ability/disposition/power predicates to social wholes. For example, the examples 
mentioned by Lawson above seem to be imported from ordinary language more or less straight off (consider also 
the examples in footnote 7). Such ascriptions (when read non-technically) can be true although there are no ontic 
powers at the social level. (I would give the same verdict regarding many of the physical examples employed by 
defenders of social powers: consider Lawson’s example of a house (2013:  286-287) or Elder-Vass’s (2012:84) 
exemple of a torch; cf. Searle’s (2016) criticism of Lawson.)				
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sentence is tokened) is true, intuitively it follows that “water is a solvent for sugar” is true, 
and vice versa. On the conditional analysis, such entailments can be explained easily: the 
relevant ability ascriptions have the same truth condition, namely: if some sugar were put in 
water, it would dissolve. (Or, to use an example inspired by Lawson’s putative positional 
abilities: If doctors can (or have the ability to) prescribe drugs to patients, then intuitively, 
patients can (or have the ability to) be prescribed drugs by doctors. An ordinary language 
statement expressing either sort of ability seems to have a truth condition with roughly the 
following conditional structure: if a doctor were to fill in and sign a document of certain kind, 
then the patient referred to in the document would be prescribed a drug (of the kind specified 
in the document in question).) But notice that on the powers semantics, the entailment does 
not hold, because on that understanding “water is a solvent for sugar” can be true without 
“sugar is water-soluble” being true, and vice versa. On the powers semantics, the ascriptions 
have distinct truth conditions involving distinct powers inhering in distinct objects, and one of 
the subjects may very well lack the relevant ontic power.18  
Thus, all in all, I think the standard, ontologically non-committal, conditional 
analysis of ordinary ability and disposition statements has a lot going for it. An obvious 
benefit is that this analysis allows ability ascriptions to the social realm to be true –  
ascriptions that would be false, or at least highly problematic, on the intrinsic powers 
account. This notwithstanding, many social scientists and philosophers are, it seems, 
implicitly adopting the powers reading of such ascriptions. (A notable exception is Lindahl 
and Reidhav 2017: 162 who adopt a conditional analysis.) It may be that at least some of them 
are misled by surface grammar, and perhaps, in some cases, by certain philosophical (and in 
																																																						
18	It is sometimes suggested that a power typically need a “mutual manifestation partner” to (jointly) cause an 
effect, and hence that powers typically do operate in tandem with some other power(s) (see e.g. Mumford and 
Anjum 2011: 34). On the classical version of this view, “active powers” co-operate with “passive powers” or 
“liabilities” to produce the effect (see e.g. Aristotle’s Metaphysics, book Theta; Locke 1689/2004: 220; Harré 
and Madden 1975: 89). Note, however, that this kind of view is usually defended as a metaphysical thesis, not a 
thesis about the semantic analysis of dispositional predication. The mutual-manifestation-partner view does not 
follow from the powers semantics as such. The powers semantics is compatible with only one of the ascriptions 
being true. For example, on the powers semantics, it might be true that water is a solvent for sugar, because 
water does indeed have an ontic power to dissolve sugar (an active power), although it is false that sugar is 
water-soluble, because sugar lacks the relevant (passive) ontic power. This will be the case if sugar has only 
categorical properties or powers to do things other than dissolving in water. Thus, the power in water may be a 
power to act – i.e. to dissolve sugar – when these categorical properties/powers are present, which are then mere 
“difference makers”. This asymmetric situation cannot be excluded by semantic considerations alone (see my 
2006 and ms). However, on the conditional analysis, by analytic necessity, if water is a solvent for sugar then 
sugar is water-soluble (and vice versa). And similarly, on the conditional analysis, by analytic necessity, if 
doctors have the ability to prescribe drugs to patients, then patients have the ability to be prescribed drugs by 
doctors (and vice versa). 	
	 16	
my view erroneous) doctrines relating to the interpretation of ability/dispositional 
statements.19  
 Secondly, some defenders of powers in the social realm seem to have conflated 
sociallyE grounded “constitutive” abilities (an alternative name would be “performative” 
abilities, cf. Austin 1962) with causal powers. For example, recall that Lawson mentioned, as 
examples of powers, abilities of social systems to raise taxes, establish international treaties, 
and monetary unions, but also abilities of individual persons (police officers, judges and 
doctors) to arrest suspects, pass sentences, and prescribe drugs (for similar examples, see 
Harré 1970: 92; Harré and Madden 1975: 95; Elder-Vass 2010: 73, 173, 199; 2012: 87, 89). 
Many of these abilities are, I think, first and foremost constitutive in nature (cf. Searle 1969; 
1995; Goldman 1970; Smith 2014). Consider, for example, a national governmental body 
with the ability (the putative power) to establish international treaties. By signing a certain 
document, the governmental body does not cause the establishment of the relevant 
international treaty. Rather, the act, in the relevant context (along with other acts such as the 
signing of the document by other appropriately authorised parties), is or constitutes the 
establishment of the treaty. Of course, the actual writing process is (at some level) a physical, 
causal process; but this process (or rather the end stage of it), which more or less anyone who 
can write can reproduce, non-casually constitutes the establishment of the treaty in the context 
in question. As John Searle would put it, in the societal context in question, the act counts – in 
line with his general formula for constitutive rules: X counts as Y in context C (Searle 1969: 
34-35; 1995: 43-44)20 – as the establishment of the treaty (Alvin Goldman, 1970: 25-26, 
would say that the act involves “conventional generation”).21  
																																																						
19	Much of what Daniel Little says in his recent book about social powers and their microfoundations (Little 
2016, especially Ch. 6) would become less perplexing if he explicitly and firmly adopted the distinction 
defended above between mere true dispositional predications (abundant “properties”) and ontic powers (sparse 
properties). He writes, for example: “On this standpoint, powers are attributions we make to things when we 
don’t know quite enough about their composition to work out the physics or sociology of the underlying 
mechanisms. They do attach to the entity or structure in question, surely enough; but they do so in virtue of 
physical or sociological composition of the entity, not of some inherent metaphysical property” (p. 199). The 
view expressed here is actually quite similar to a view, defended by Prior et al. (1982: 256), according to which 
mere “dispositions” (second-order properties, according to them) need causal bases (e.g. ontic powers) at some 
lower level. But a few pages later Little says: “And, we might seek to demonstrate that all causal powers depend 
on combinations of these sorts of ‘primitive’ causal powers – a kind of Hobbesian materialism. But this is 
needlessly strenuous from a metaphysical point of view. Better to consider the middle-level range of powers and 
mechanisms where we are able to move upward and downward in our search for underlying causal mechanisms 
and supervening causal powers” (ibid.: 204, my emphases). Little also fails to notice that many of the putative 
meso-level powers discussed in the philosophy of social science literature are not intrinsic to their bearers.  	
20	For a detailed discussion of Searle’s theory, see my (2014a).	
21	Compare, in a paper on performatives in general Searle says: “In order intentionally to produce changes in the 
world through our actions, normally our bodily movements have to sett off a chain of ordinary physical 
causation. If, for example, I am trying to hammer a nail into a board or start the car, my bodily movements […] 
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Likewise, if a doctor fills in a form to prescribe a drug, she does not thereby 
cause the prescription of the drug. The act in question is or constitutes the prescription of the 
drug. And when a policeman grabs a suspect while declaring “You’re under arrest!”, the act 
does not cause the arrest – it is or constitutes the arrest. The same holds, I would argue, for 
many of the other putative powers, such as the ability of a governmental body to raise taxes, 
the ability of a university to assign grades, the ability of a judge to pass sentences, the ability 
of a manager to fire an employee, and so on.  
That we are not dealing with causal powers here is indicated – apart from the 
obvious extrinsic, conventional grounding of the abilities – by the fact that the relevant “acts” 
and their putative “effects”, were they genuinely causal, would in many cases violate the 
actual speed-limit to causal propagation, i.e. the speed of light (see e.g. Salmon 1984: 141).22 
Consider, for example, the act of grading. When a student is assigned a grade, the student 
acquires the grade (i.e. the “property” of having such and such a grade, the putative “effect”) 
as soon as the official grading (the putative “cause”, fundamentally, the inscribing of some 
marks on a piece of paper, or something similar) has occurred, irrespective of the student’s 
whereabouts. The student may have travelled to the other side of the earth, and still “acquire” 
the grade at the relevent time. Similar situations obtain when a criminal is sentenced 
(although in such a case the distance will typically be shorter), an employee is fired, an 
academic is promoted to professor, a citizen’s taxes are raised, and so on. Better, I think, to 
conceive of such putative “effects” as instances of non-causal, so-called “mere Cambridge 
changes”: a predicate (expressing an abundant extrinsic “property”) begins to apply to a 
certain person (or a group of people) at a certain time simply in virtue of changes or events 
that take place elsewhere at that time (see e.g. Kim 1974; Shoemaker 1980/1997; Mellor 
1998: 87-88). In the case of grading: a physical act that counts as an official grading of person 
x occurs at place p and time t, whereby a predicate of the form “x has acquired grade Φ” 
becomes true of x (i.e., it becomes an institutional truth or fact that x has acquired grade Φ at 
t), although x exists at distinct place p´ at time t.  
																																																																																																																																																																									
will cause the desired effect. But there is an important class of actions where intention, bodily movement and 
desired effect are not related by physical causation in this way. If somebody says, ‘The meeting is adjourned,’ ‘I 
pronounce you husband and wife,’ ‘War is declared,’ or ‘You’re fired,’ he may succeed in changing the world in 
the ways specified in these utterances just by performing the relevant speech acts. […] As a general point, the 
difference between pounding a nail and adjourning a meeting is that in the case of adjourning the meeting the 
intention to perform the action, as manifested in the appropriately bodily movement (in this case the appropriate 
utterances) perfomed by a person duly authorized, and recognized by the audience, is constitutive of bringing 
about the desired change.” (Searle 1989: 547-548)   	
22	See also my (2017a) in which I argue in detail against Mumford and Anjum’s theory of simultaneous power-
causation (Mumford and Anjum 2011, Ch. 5). 	
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Thus, ascriptions of such abilities (to establish international treaties, raise taxes, 
assign grades, arrest suspects, pass sentences, and so on) to social entities and individuals 
ought not, as such, to be taken as attributions of causal powers (beyond the required, 
underlying physical powers). Again, it seems more appropriate to understand these ability 
ascriptions in line with the conditional analysis. For example, to say that a judge x has an 
ability to pass a sentence, is to say, roughly, that if x were to do y, a sentence would be 
passed. No socialE causal power is hereby ascribed to the judge (which would be a 
contradiction in terms), only a “constitutive” ability, which is held relative to a certain societal 
context in which a judge’s doing y counts, by convention, as a sentence being passed.  
 Thirdly, and relatedly, some defenders of powers in the social realm seem 
occasionally to illicitly equate causal powers with so-called deontic powers (sometimes 
labelled positive and negative conventional powers, or, in legal literature, legal powers and 
liabilities) – that is, with rights, privileges, entitlements, obligations, responsibilities, duties, 
etc. (see e.g. Searle 1995: 100; Searle 2010: 8-9; Hohfeld 1913). Consider Lawson again, who 
says:  
 
…an individual allocated to the position university professor, acquires the 
social/positional identity of (is accepted within a community as possessing the status 
of) university professor; and so on. […] a position is essentially a locus of a set of 
specific rights and obligations, where the accepted position occupants are agents or 
bearers of these rights and obligations and typically possess a status or identity 
associated with them. But any given position is always constituted in relation to 
others. And the rights of individuals in one group over individuals in another are 
matched by obligations of the latter group members with respect to the former. […] 
If positional rights and obligations ultimately relate to ways in which certain 
positioned individuals can influence the behaviour of others, it follows that rights 
and obligations are in effect positional powers, respectively positive and negative 
powers. For the agents of rights (positive powers) have the causal capacity 
intentionally to get others, the subjects of those rights (those with relevant 
obligations, or negative powers), to do something whether the latter want to do that 
something or not. (Lawson 2013: 292-293, emphases original; see also Elder-Vass 
2010: 153, 159)  
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However, as Searle stresses, deontic powers are extrinsic (1995: 9-13, 100-101, 104-112), 
while causal powers are, as we have seen, intrinsic. Deontic powers are generally assigned to 
persons (or groups or other entities) via laws or other regulations, or simply through people’s 
acceptance of the assignment. Causal powers, on the other hand, are had by objects in virtue 
of their intrinsic nature (e.g. Harré 1970: 85; Bhaskar 1975/2008: 231; see fn. 4 for further 
references). For this reason, Searlean deontic powers and Aristotelian/Harréan/Bhaskarian 
causal powers cannot be equated.23  
If Lawson and likeminded people nevertheless want to insist that deontic powers are 
a species of intrinsic causal power, they will have to adopt the community move involving 
strictly emergent properties discussed in Section 3. However, that would make whole 
communities the bearers of the relevant “negative” and “positive” powers, and not the 
individuals/sub-systems therein. I do not think much sense can be made of such a proposal. 
For one thing, as Lawson himself stresses, “the rights of individuals in one group over 
individuals in another are matched by obligations of the latter group members with respect to 
the former” (2013: 292-293, see also Hohfeld 1913: 30). This characteristic and crucial 
feature of deontic powers will be lost if only whole communities are agents of deontic 
powers. That is, it will no longer be strictly true to say that:  
 
If university teachers have the right to set exams, students have the obligation to sit 
them, just as students have the right to expect the exams to be marked, and fairly, 
and teachers have an obligation to undertake this. (Lawson 2013: 293)  
 
The community move for equating deontic and causal powers will also have to involve 
downward causation, and I have argued that causation of this kind is redundant unless the 
emergent powers of communities can somehow causally intervene and produce new 
behaviours of the interrelated individuals in the society in question – an idea which seems 
highly questionable. Finally, the community move in any case faces the obvious objection 
that deontic and causal powers clearly seem to be distinct inasmuch as deontic powers are 
																																																						
23	Cf. Hohfeld, who pointed out more than a hundred years ago: “it is necessary to distinguish carefully between 
the legal power [and] the physical power to do the things necessary for the ‘exercise’ of the legal power” 
(Hohfeld 1913: 52, emphases original). And Searle: “[…] let us say that all deontic status-functions are matters 
of conventional power. This terminology enables us to distinguish conventional power from brute physical 
power, even though of course the two often go hand in hand; because often the point of giving conventional 
power is to authorize the use of brute physical power” (Searle 1995: 100, emphasis original). Surprisingly, in his 
recent commentary on Lawson, Searle (2016) does not explicitly discuss this crucial distinction between deontic 
and causal powers (although see (ibid.: 411) for some brief remarks about function and physical realization).	
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normative while causal powers appear to be utterly devoid of normativity. All in all, then, I 
think deontic and causal powers should be kept distinct.     
 My denial that deontic powers are causal powers does not entail that the former 
– apart from their enabling constitutive abilities24 – have no causal relevance in a society, i.e. 
make no causal difference at all. My argument is simply that being causally relevant does not 
necessarily mean being a power, not even on a powers metaphysics. Recall the discussion of 
Newtonian gravitation in Section 3: we saw there that, even if massive objects have a power 
to attract one another,25 the magnitude of the ensuing accelerations (absent disturbing factors) 
also depends on how far apart the powerful objects are. Hence, their distance is, in some 
sense, causally relevant: it makes a difference to how strongly the mass-powers interact. But 
again, spatial separation need not itself be a power to make such a difference. (Indeed, 
distance is a relation, and is typically not regarded as a power in the literature; see e.g. Ellis 
2001: 137-138.) Plausibly, this kind of causal relevance or difference making can be 
expressed by a counterfactual: had the distance differed, the resulting gravitational force on 
the objects would have been different.26 However, the truth-maker for this counterfactual 
could simply involve the nature of the relevant mass-powers: how they react to 
increasing/diminishing distance (cf. Chakravartty 2007: 144-147). The situation may be 
similar, I suggest, with rights and obligations (within obvious limits!). That is, people may be 
inclined – perhaps in virtue of their intrinsic ontic causal powers, if they instantiate such 
properties – to react to rights and obligations in certain ways in certain contexts without these 
rights and obligations themselves being powers. (In a contrast with spatial relations, rights 
and obligations appear to be even less ontologically robust and objective, being mere 
institutional or conventional “entities” which are existentially dependent on human actions 
and attitudes.) Thus, without being causal powers, deontic powers may nevertheless be 
“causally relevant” in the sense that they “make a difference” to how people behave, plausibly 
indirectly by being represented and taken into account in people’s decision making: were the 
																																																						
24	A legislative body has the “ability” to legislate (i.e. if the relevant persons that make up the legislative body 
were to act in a certain way, a law would be passed, but not caused), and arguably it “has” this constitutive 
ability partly in virtue of having the mandate or right to legislate (which might be a legal right, or more 
specifically, a legal privilege, see Hohfeld 1913: 34-36).	
25	I use this example for illustrative purposes only. I am well aware that Newtonian gravitation has given way to 
Einstein’s curved space-time, which contains no gravitational forces.  
26	I would deny, however, that counterfactual dependence is in general a sufficient condition for causality, or for 
causal relevance or causal difference making. Examples of counterfactual dependences which are not causal are 
famously given by Kim (1973). To the list, I would add socially constitutive counterfactuals of the type, “Had 
the national governmental body not signed the document, the international treaty would not have been 
established”, “Had the judge not passed the sentence, the criminal would not have been convicted”, etc.; cf. 
above.				
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deontic powers distributed differently, people would (generally) make other decisions and act 
differently (cf. Searle 2001). But again, the truth of this counterfactual does not entail that 
deontic powers are causal powers.27 
 
5. Conclusion 
Philosophers and social scientists have become increasingly eager to apply the powers 
ontology to the social domain. I have argued that this application is misguided – powers in the 
social realm are either contradictory or redundant entities – and is based on a number of 
mistakes and conflations. Alleged social causation had better be conceptualized in other 
terms. 
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